We unveil the existence of a vulnerability in Wi Fi, which allows an adversary to remotely launch a Denial-of Service (DoS) attack that propagates both in time and space. This vulnerability sterns from a coupling effect induced by hidden nodes. Cascading DoS attacks can congest an entire network and do not require the adversary to violate any protocol. We demonstrate the feasibility of such attacks through experiments with real Wi-Fi cards, extensive ns-3 simulations, and theoretical analysis. The simulations show that the attack is efTective both in networks operating under fixed and varying bit rates, as weil as ad hoc and infrastructure modes. To gain insight into the root
I. INTRODUCTION Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) is a technology widely used to access the Internet. Wi-Fi connectivity is provided by a variety of organizations operating over a shared RF spectrum. These include schools, libraries, companies, towns and government, as well as ISP hotspots and residential wireless routers. Wi Fi trafik is also rapidly rising due to increased offtoading by cellular operators [1] . The importance of Wi-Fi networks and the need to strengthen their resilience to intentional and non intentional interference have been recognized by companies, such as Cisco [2] .
Wi-Fi networks rely on simple, distributed mechanisms to arbitrate access to the shared spectrum and optimize per formance. Such mechanisms include carrier sensing multiple access (CSMA), exponential back-offs, and bit rate adapta tion. The behavior of these mechanisms in isolated single hop networks has been extensively studied and is generally well-understood (see, e.g., [3] ). However, due to interference coupling, these mechanisms result in complex interactions in multi-hop settings. As a consequence, different networks do not always evolve independently, even if they are located far away. Figure 1 serves to ilIustrate this phenomenon at a high level. Suppose that an attacker increases the rate at wh ich it generates packets, and transmits these packets in accordance with the IEEE 802.11 protocol. These transmissions may cause packet collisions at nodes concurrently receiving packets from other sources. Due to the infamous hidden node problem, 978-1-5090-3065-1/16/$31.00 ©2016 IEEE wh ich is hard to avoid in wireless networks, transmitters may be unable to hear transmission by other nodes, even when using CSMA, and hence keep retransmitting packets until they reach the so-called retry limit of the back-off procedure. These retransmissions affect other neighbours and may propagate.
While an option al mechanism, called RTS/CTS, has been designed to combat the hidden node problem, it increases overhead and latency especially at high bit rates. Since the cost of the RTS/CTS exchange usually does not justify its benefits, it is commonly disabled [4] , [5] . Indeed, most manufacturers of Wi-Fi cards disable RTS/CTS by default and discourage changing this setting as explicitly stated in [6] - [9] .
The coupling phenomenon induced by interferences creates multi-hop dependencies, wh ich an adversary can take advantage of to launch a widespread network attack from a single location. We refer to such an attack as a cascading Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. Cascading DoS attacks are especially dangerous because they aff'ect the entire network and do not require the adversary to violate any protocol (i.e., the attacks are protocol compliant).
The contributions of this paper are as folIows. First, we unveil the existence of a vulnerability in the IEEE 802.11 standard, which allows an attacker to launch protocol-compliant cascading DoS attacks. In contrast to existing jamming attacks, the attacker does not need to be in the vicinity of the victims.
Second, we provide a concrete attack that exploits this vulnerability in certain network scenarios. We demonstrate the attack through experiments on a testbed composed of nodes equipped with real Wi-Fi cards, and through extensive ns-3 simulations.
Third, we show the existence of a phase transition. When the packet generation rate of the attacker is lower than the phase transition point, it has vanishing effect on the rest of the network. However, once the packet generation rate exceeds the phase transition point, the network becomes entirely congested.
Finally, we develop a new analytical model that sheds light into the phase transition observed in the simulations and experiments. The analysis predicts for which values of the retry limit a phase transition (and hence a cascading attack) can occur, and explicitly characterizes the phase transition region in terms of the system parameters. In particular, we show that Transmissions by an attacker impact nodes located far away, due to interference coupling caused by hidden nodes. a phase transition can occur for the default value of the retry limit in Wi-Fi, which is 7.
The rest of the paper is organized as folIows. In Section 11, we discuss related work. In Section III, we provide brief back ground on Wi-Fi and hidden nodes, and introduce our network model. We present and discuss experimental and simulation results in Section IV. In Section V, we present an analytical model that explains the behavior of the network and the impact of various parameters, and compare the analytical and simulation results. In Section VI, we concIude the paper and discuss possible mitigation methods. Due to space limitation, most proofs are omitted. They can be found in [10].
RELATED WORK
In general, the main goal of a DoS attack is to make com munication impossible for legitimate users. Within the context of wireless networks, a simple and popular means to launch a DoS attack is to jam the network with high power transmissions of random bits, hence creating interferences and congestion. Jamming at the physical layer, together with anti-jamming countermeasures, have been extensively studied (cf. [11] for a monograph on this subject).
More recently, several works have developed and demon strated smart jamming attacks. These attacks exploit protocol vulnerabilities across various layers in the stack to achieve high jamming gain and energy efficiency, and a low probability of detection [12] . For instance, [13] shows that the energy consumption of a smart jamming attack can be four orders of magnitude lower than continuous jamming. The works in [14] , [15] show that several Wi-Fi bit rate adaptation algorithms, such as SampIeRate, ONOE, AMRR, and RARF, are vulnerable to smart jamming. However, both conventional and smart jamming attacks are usually non-protocol compliant. Moreover, they require physical proximity. These limitations can be used to identify and locate the jammer.
In contrast, in this work we show how a protocol-compliant DoS attack can be remotely launched by exploiting coupling due to hidden nodes in Wi-Fi. Rate adaptation algorithms further amplify this attack due to their in ability to distinguish between collisions, interferences, and poor channels. One po tential mitigation is to design a rate adaptation algorithm whose behaviour is based on the observed interference patterns [16] , [17] . However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these rate adaptation algorithms are used in practice. Our work is based on Minstrel [18] , which is the most recent, popular, and robust rate adaptation algorithm for Linux systems.
The attacks that we are investigating bear similarity to cascading failures in power transmission systems [19] , [20] . When one of the nodes in the system fails, it shifts its load to adjacent nodes. These nodes in turn can be overloaded and shift their load further. This phenomenon has also been studied in wireless networks. For instance, [21] , [22] model wireless networks as a random geometric graph topology generated by a Poisson point process. They use percolation theory to show that the redistribution of load induces a phase transition in the network connectivity. However, the cascading phenomenon that we investigate in this paper is different from cascading failure studied in those works. In our work, the exogenous trafik arriving at each node is independent. That is, a node will not shift its load to other nodes. The amount of traffic measUfed on the channel increases due to packet retransmissions caused by packet collisions, rather than due to traffic redistribution.
The work in [23] , [24] show that local coupling due to in terferences can have global effects on wireless networks. Thus, [23] proposes a queuing-theoretic analysis and approximation to predict the probability of a packet collision in a multi-hop network with hidden nodes. It shows that the sequence of the packet collision probabilities in a linear network converges to a fixed point. The work in [24] evaluates the impact of rate adaption and finds out that traffic increase at a single node can congest an entire network, and points out the existence of a phase transition.
Our paper differs in several aspects. First, it considers an adversarial context, and shows how interference-induced cou pling can be exploited to cause denial of service. Second, to oUf knowledge, it is the first work to demonstrate the existence of such coupling on real commodity hardware. Third, oUf simulations are based on a high-fidelity wireless simulator (ns-3), capable of capturing the effects of rate adaptation algorithms and accurately modeling infrastructUfe networks. Finally, our analytical model is original and captUfes the impact of the retry limit and traffic parameters. A key result is that a cascading attack can be launched for the default value of the retry limit in Wi-Fi, a result validated by the experiments and simulations.
BACKGROUND AND MODEL
We first review key aspects of IEEE 802.11 and then describe the network model under consideration.
A. Wi-Fi Summary
Wi-Fi is a wireless local area network (WLAN) technology, which mainly runs on 2.4 GHz ISM bands and 5 GHz bands [5] . The IEEE 802.11 standard is a series of specifications, such as the media access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) interfaces. The first 802.11 standard that gained widespread success is 802.11 b. It runs on 2.4 GHz bands and has up to 11 Mb/s bit rate. The subsequent standards (e.g., 802.11a, g, n, and ac) increased the bit rates using high er order modulation along with coding, OFDM, MIMO, and wider bands. It is noteworthy that 802.11 b is the only mode that supports communication at 1 Mb/s. Hence, when the bit rate reduces to 1 Mb/s, Wi-Fi network reverts to the 802.11 b mode. Generally, this lower bit rate has high er resistance to interference during transmission and is able to operate over lower SNR channels.
The IEEE 802.11 standard uses a CSMAICA mechanism to control access to the transmission medium and avoid collisions. After a packet is sent, the node waits for a short interframe slots (SIFS) period to receive an ACK. Whenever the channel becomes idle, nodes wait for a distributed interframe space (DIFS > SIFS) per iod to start contending for the channel.
B. Hidden Node Problem
A typical instance of the hidden node problem is illustrated in Figure 2 . The figure shows three nodes: a transmitter, a receiver and a hidden node. The dashed circIe represents the transmission range of the node. Since the transmitter and the hidden node cannot sense each other, a collision happens when both of them transmit packets at the same time.
A packet collision triggers aretransmission. In IEEE 802.11, there is an upper limit on the number of retransmissions that a packet can incur, called retry limit and denoted by R (the default value is R = 7). If the retry count of a packet exceeds the retry limit, the packet is dropped. The channel utilization of a node increases with the probability of a packet collision. In the worst case, the utilization can be R times larger than in the absence of packet collisions. Therefore, the access channel of a node can easily be saturated if it is forced to retransmit packets.
C. Network Model
The network model considered in this paper is shown in Figure 3 . We consider N pairs of nodes. Each node Ai (i = 0,1,2, ... , N) transmits packets to node Bi. The dashed circIe represents the range of transmission. Node BHI can receive packets from both node Ai and node AH1. However, node Ai and node AH 1 cannot hear each other. That is, node Fig. 3 : Topology of the network. Node Ai transmits packets to node Bi. Node Ai is a hidden node with respect to AHI.
Ai is a hidden node with respect to node Ai+! (and vice versa). A packet collision happens at node Bi+! when packet transmissions by node Ai and AH1 overlap.
Our goal is to investigate how node Ao can trigger a cascading DoS attack, resulting in a congestion collapse over the entire network. We start by increasing the packet generation rate at node Ao. Node Ao transmits packets over its channel, in compliance with the IEEE 802.11 standard. The transmissions by node Ao cause packet collisions at node BI. These collisions require node Al to retransmit packets. The increased amount of packet transmissions and retransmissions by node Al impact node A2 and so forth. If this effect keeps propagating and amplifying, then the result is a network-wide denial of service, which we refer to as a cascading Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Because this attack is protocol-compliant, it is difficult to detect or trace back to the initiator. We note that the topology studied here could arise over different time and space in more complex network configurations.
IV. EX PERIMENTAL AND SIMULAT ION RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of launching cascading DoS attacks both through experiments and simula tions. We first show resuIts on an experimental testbed using real Wi-Fi cards. We then use ns-3 simulations to investigate how this attack can be performed in significantly larger scale networks, and under different settings (ad hoc, infrastructure, fixed bit rate, and adaptive bit rate).
A. Experiments
We set up an experimental testbed composed of six nodes. The testbed configuration is shown in Figure 4 . We establish an IEEE 802.11 n ad hoc network consisting of three pairs of nodes. Each node consists of a PC and a TP-LINK TL MN722N Wireless USB Adapter. We use RF cables and splitters to link the nodes, isolate them from external traffic, and obtain reproducible results.
We pI ace 70 dB attenuators on links between node Ai and Bi (i E 0,1,2), and 60 dB attenuators on links between nodes Ai and BH 1. The difference in the signal attenuation of different links insures that a packet loss occurs if a hidden node transmits. In practice, such a situation may occur if nodes Ai and Bi+! communicate without obstacIes, while node Ai and Bi are separated by an office wall [25] . The transmission power of each node is set to 0 dBm. We use iPerf [26] to generate When node Ao starts increasing its packet generation rate, the throughput of nodes Al and A2 vanishes.
UDP data streams and to measure the throughput achieved on each node. The length of a packet is the default IP packet size of 1500 bytes. Figure 5 demonstrates the cascading DoS attack on the experimental testbed. At first, the packet generation rates of nodes Ao , Al and A2 are set to 400 Kb/s. We observe that the throughput of all the nodes remains in the vicinity of 400 Kb/s during the first 300 seconds. After 300 seconds, Ao starts transmitting packets at 1 Mb/s. As a result, the throughput of nodes Al and A2 suddenly vanishes. On ce node Ao resumes transmitting at 400 Kb/s, the throughput of node Al and node A2 recovers.
B. Simulations
In the previous section, we demonstrated the feasibility of launching a cascading DoS attack on an experimental testbed. This testbed relies on commercial cards that are black boxes for all purposes. For instance, the driver of the Wi-Fi card and the rate adaptation algorithm are closed-source. There are also substantial usage restrictions, such as parameter settings.
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OA OB OB Load at node Ao (a) As the traffie load at node Ao inereases, the utilization of remote nodes (e.g., A20 and A4o) exhibits a phase transition. In order to gain a better insight into the attack in large scale networks, we resort to ns-3 simulations, a state-of-the-art simulator which incIudes high-fidelity wireless libraries. We show the occurrence of cascading DoS attacks: 1) In ad hoc networks with fixed bit rate.
2) In ad hoc networks under Minstrel rate adaptation.
3) In infrastructure networks. 1) Fixed bit rate: We first describe the occurrence of a cascading DoS attack in an ad hoc network with fixed bit rate. We consider a linear topology consisting of 40 pairs of nodes (i.e. a sequence of 40 hidden nodes), as shown in Figure 3 . We fix the bit rate to 1 Mb/s and the retry limit to R = 7. We set up a Wi-Fi network using the standard IEEE 802.11 library in ns-3. At each node Ai , i ?: 1, UDP packets arrive at rate Ai = 8.125 pkts/s. The packet generation rate at node Ao, AO, varies from 1.25 to 61.25 pkts/s. The size of each packet is 2000 bytes. Each node has the same transmission power (40 mW). We set the propagation loss between node Ai and Bi to 80 dB and the propagation loss between node Ai and Bi+! to 70 dB. We run each simulation five times for 1,000 seconds, and average out the results.
The (exogenous) load at each node Ai is denoted Pi = AiT , where T represents the duration of each packet transmission attempt (0.016 second in our case). The utilization of a node Ai , denoted Ui , is defined as the fraction of time the node is busy transmitting bits on the channel. Figure 6 depicts the utilization Ul , U20 , and U40 as a function of Po, the load at node Ao. The utilization of node Al , UI , increases smoothly until it reaches its upper limit. However, the utilizations of nodes A20 and A40 remain low until Uo reaches a certain threshold around Po = 0.5, at which point U20 and U40 suddenly jump to a high value. This sudden jump corresponds to a phase transition, and the critical threshold represents the phase transition point.
2) Rate Adaptation: We next consider the same network setting as in the previous section, but this time we assume that nodes can transmit at different bit rates. We specifically assume that nodes implement the Minstrel rate adaptation algorithm. When node Ao generates packets at 5 Mb/s and transmits, the throughput of nodes A20 and A40 vanishes.
In this case, the attack works by coercing the rate adaptation algorithm to reduce the bit rate to 1 Mb/s at each node, thus leading to similar results to those shown in Section IV-B l. In our simulations, the parameter EWMA of Minstrel is set to 0.25. [27] We set Ao = 312.5 pkts/s and Ai = 31.25 pkts/s (i ?: 1) for the packet generation rates. As shown in Figure 7 , packet transmissions at node Ao start after t = 100 s. During the first 100 seconds, the throughput of nodes A20 and A40 remain around 0.5 Mb/s, wh ich implies that all the packets are received. Once node Ao starts transmitting packets, the throughput of nodes A20 and A40 is brought down to close to zero. We also observe that the bit rates at node A20 and A40 go down to 1 Mb/s, due to the repeated packet collisions. Once node Ao stops transmitting at t = 700 s, nodes A20 and A40 recover.
3) InJrastructure networks: We next show that cascading DoS attacks are also feasible in infrastructure networks. Since the infrastructure mode is more widely used than ad hoc in practice, the feasibility of the cascading DoS attack in infras tructure networks increases its severity and potential impact. We repeat the simulations of Section IV-B2 except that we set nodes Bi as access points, and nodes Ai as stations. Figure 8 shows similar results as in Section IV-B2. When the cascading DoS attack starts, the remote nodes in the sequence exhibit a phase transition. However, we observe a larger lag in the propagation of the DoS attack compared to ad hoc networks.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we develop an analytical model that provides insight into the network behaviour observed in the simulations and experiments. Specifically, our goal is to explain why and under what conditions the phase transition occurs, and shed light into the roles played by the retry limit R and the trafik load at the different nodes.
A. Model
We consider the linear topology shown in Figure 3 . Packet arrivals at each node Ai form a Poisson process with rate Ai. The packet size is fixed and the duration of each packet transmission attempt is T (we assume a fixed bit rate). A transmISSiOn by node Ai+! is successful only if does not overlap with any transmission by (hidden) node Ai.
If a packet collides, it is retransmitted until either lt lS successfully received or the retry count reaches the limit R. Let ri represent the mean retry count at node Ai. Then, the mean service time of a packet at node Ai is riT. To keep the analysis tractable, timing details of Wi-Fi, such as DIFS, SIFS, and back-off inter-frame spacings are ignored.
We denote the utilization of node Ai by 0 ::; ui ::; 1, where Ui represents the fraction of time node Ai transmits. If Ui = 1, node Ai is congested and transmits continuously. Otherwise, node Ai is uncongested and transmits packets at rate riA. Therefore, the utilization of node Ai for all i ;::: 0 is
(1)
Note that ro = 1.
Our model represents a special case of interacting queues, which are notoriously difficult to analyze [28] . To make the analysis tractable, we assume that 1) Packet transmissions and retransmissions at each uncon gested node Ai form a Poisson process with rate riA.
2) The probability that a packet transmitted by node Ai col lides is independent of previous attempts. This probability is denoted P i. The above assumptions are similar to the "random-look" model used by Kleinrock and Tobagi in their analysis of (single hop) random access networks [29] . We stress that beside these assumptions, the rest of our analysis is exact.
B. Iterative analysis 0/ the utilization
Our goal is to find the utilization at each node i ;::: 0 and in the limit as i -+ 00. We consider the same scenario as in our simulations, whereby node Ao (the attacker) varies its traffk load
while all other nodes Ai (i ;::: 1) have the same traffk load
where 0 < P < 1. We aim to und erstand if and how changes in the value of Po affect the utilization of nodes that are located far away as a function of the parameters p and R.
First, we get the utilization at node Ao:
We next develop an iterative procedure to derive Ui+! from Ui. From (1) and (3),
We first relate rH I to P H I, the probability that a packet transmitted by node AH 1 collides. Based on Assumption 2, the probability that a packet is successfully received after 1 ::; r ::; R atternpts is (1 -P i+!)( P i+!r -1 while the probability that a packet fails to be received after R attempts is ( P H I ) R . Hence, the mean retry count at node Ai+! is
We next relate P H I to Ui. First, suppose Ui < 1 (i.e., node Ai is uncongested). WLOG, assume that node AH 1 starts a packet transmission (or retransmission) at time t = O. We compute P i+! by conditioning on whether or not node Ai is transmitting at time t = O. Note that due the Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages (PASTA) property, the transmission state of node Ai at time t = 0 is the same as at any random point of time.
If node Ai transmits at time t = 0, wh ich occurs with proba bility Ui, then the packet transmitted by node AH 1 collides. If node Ai does not transmit at time 0, then a collision occurs only if node i starts a transmission during the interval [0, T]. Such an event occurs with probability (1 -e-r,>.S) = (1 -e -U,), according to Assumption 1. We therefore obtain
(7) Next, suppose Ui = 1 (i.e., node Ai is congested). In that case, all the transmissions by node AH 1 collide and P H I = 1. We note that (7) still provides the correct result.
Putting (5), (6), and (7) together, we obtain Ui+! = min {pt, (1-e-Ui(l_ Ui)r-1 , I} . (8)
C. Limiting behavior 0/ the utilization We next analyze the limiting behaviour of the iteration given by (8). The sequence (Ui)� O corresponds to a discrete non-linear dynamical system [30] . Such systems are generally complex as they may converge to a point, to a cycle (i.e., they exhibit periodic behavior), or not converge at all (i.e., they exhibit chaotic behavior).
The main result of this section is to show that the sequence (Ui)� O always converges to a point. However, the limit depends on the initial utilization Uo.
To simplify notation, we define the function
We then rewrite (8) as folIows:
We say that w E [0,1] is a fixed point of (10) if w = min {f (w ) , I} .
(10) (11) Suppose (11) has K different fixed points (Theorem 2 in the sequel will show that K ;::: 1). We denote by n the ordered set of all the fixed points of (11) . That is,
where w1 < ... < w k < ... < wK.
The following theorem states that the limit of the sequence (Ui)� O is always one of the elements in rl. 3) If WK < 1 and Uo E ( w K,l], the sequence (Ui)� O converges to W K .
D. Phase transition analysis
In the previous section, we showed that the limit of the sequence of node utilizations (Ui)� O must be one of the fixed points in the set rl. A phase transition represents a situation where a small change of Uo leads to an abrupt change of the limit. Specifically, we focus on the case when the limit jumps to 1. Formally:
Definition 1 (Network congestion): A network is said to be congested if (Ui) � o converges to 1. Else, the network is said to be uncongested.
Definition 2 (Phase transition): A network experiences a phase transition if there exists a fixed point W E rl, such that if Uo < W the network is uncongested, and if Uo > W the network is congested. We refer to W as the phase transition point. We note that a phase transition can possibly occur only if WK = 1, since otherwise the network is never congested, irrespective of Uo.
A network must fall in one of the following three regimes:
1) The network is uncongested for all Uo E [0, 1].
2) The network is congested for all Uo E [0,1].
3) A phase transition occurs. Our goal in the following is to determine what regime prevails under different network parameters.
For this purpose, we investigate the existence and properties of solutions of (11) . First, we investigate the case W = 1. 
We look for solutions of (13) that belong to the interval [0,1]. Each such solution is an element of rl.
Equation (13) is difficult to work with because it contains two unknown variables, p and R. To circumvent this difficulty, we introduce the function
For each value of p, the solutions of (13) must satisfy
We denote the maximum of hR(w ) by The following theorem establishes the prevailing network regimes for different parameters. 3) If p > h'Rax, then (13) has no solution. Moreover, since p> h'Rax 2: hR( l ) = l/R, we get p > l/R. By Parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 1, the sequence (Ui)� O converges to 1 for any Uo E [0,1], and the network is always congested.
• We next illustrate Theorem 2 for different values of R, using Figure 9 . First, consider R = 4 as shown in Figure 9 (a). Since h'Rax = 1/ R = 0.25, there exists no traffic load p for wh ich a phase transition exists. Either the network is always uncongested (for p < 1/ R), or it is always congested (for p> l/R).
Next, consider R = 7 as shown in Figure 9 (b). There, h'Rax = 0.166 > 1/ R = 0.143. Hence, a phase transition occurs if p E (0.143,0.166). For instance, consider the case p = 0.15. Then, the equation hR(w ) = p has two solutions. Including the fixed point W = 1 (since p > 1/ R), the set rl has K = 3 fixed points: {Wl = 0.265,W2 = 0.777,W3 = 1}. Hence, by Theorem 2, the network is uncongested if Uo < 0.777, and congested if Uo > 0.777.
The case R = 10 also has a phase transition region, as shown in Figure 9(c) . Furthermore, the size of this region is larger since (1/ R, h'Rax) = (0.1,0.162). 
E. Sufficient condition Jor phase transition
In the previous section, we showed that a phase transition
In this section, we derive an explicit lower bound on h 'Rax, which provides a simple condition for the existence of a phase transition. First, we establish a relationship between the derivatives of hR(W) for different values of R, but a given value of w . 
The next corollary is the logical transposition of Lemma 2.
Corollary 1: If h'oo (w) ;::: 0, then h�(w) ;::: 0 for all R ;::: 1.
The following lemma establishes that the function hR(w) is always strictly increasing in the interval [0, w), where _'" 3-V5 W= ---.
(18)
Lemma 3: Let 0 :s: w < w. Then, h� (w) > 0, for all R ;::: 1.
The consequence of Lemma 3 is that for all R ;::: 1,
This equation provides a lower bound on h'Rax that can easily be computed. The next theorem establishes an even more explicit lower bound on h'Rax . Load p at node Ai (i ::> 1) Fig. 10 : Simulation of the Iimiting behavior of the node utilization in a network of 40 nodes. For R = 4, the limit is the same when Po = 0 and Po = 1, hence no phase transition is observed. However, for R = 7 and R = 10, the limits are different, hence showing the existence of a region of load p in wh ich a phase transition occurs.
We note that the lower bound on h'Rax is quite tight. For instance, h'7ax = 0.166. Moreover, h'Rax decreases with R (this follows from (14), since for any w E [0,1] the denominator increases as R gets larger).
F Comparison with simulation results
We compare the resuIts of our analysis with ns-3 simulations, for different settings of the retry limit R and load p. For the simulations, we consider an ad hoc network composed of 40 pairs of nodes, as described in Section IV-Bi. To check whether a phase transition exists for a given R, we run simulations both for Po = 0 and Po = 1. If the node utilizations in the limit (i.e., for node A40) is the same in both cases, then we ass urne that there is no phase transition. If the limits are different, then a phase transition exists. Figure 10 indicates that the existence of a phase transition is related to the retry limit, as predicted by our analysis. For the case R = 4, there is no phase transition, while a phase transition occurs in the cases R = 7 and R = 10.
The analysis also reasonably approximates the phase tran sition region. For R = 7, the simulations show that a phase transition exists if pE (0.12,0.16), while the analysis predicts p E (0.14,0.17). For R = 10, the simulation results are p E (0.08,0.14) while the analysis predicts p E (0.10,0.16). We note that the size of the phase transition region increases with R, as predicted by the analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
We describe a new type of DoS attacks against Wi-Fi networks, called cascading DoS attacks. The attack exploits a coupling vulnerability due to hidden nodes. The attack propagates beyond the starting location, lasts for long periods of time, and forces the network to operate at its lowest bit rate. The attack can be started remotely and without violating the IEEE 802.11 standard, making it difficult to trace back.
We demonstrate the feasibility of such attacks, both through experiments on a testbed and extensive ns-3 simulations. The simulations show that the attack is effective in networks oper ating under fixed and varying bit rates, as weil as ad hoc and infrastructure modes. We show that a small change in the traffic load of the attacker can lead to a phase transition of the entire network, from uncongested state to congested state.
We develop an iterative analysis to characterize the sequence of node utilizations, and study its limiting behavior. We show that the sequence always converges to fixed points. Based on the system parameters, we identify when the system remains al ways uncongested, congested, or experiences a phase transition caused by a DoS cascading attack. The analysis predicts that a phase transition occurs for R ?: 7 and provides a simple and explicit estimate of traffic load under which a phase transition occurs (i.e., pE (1/ R, 0.161)). Although the analysis is based on some simplifying assumptions, the estimate is not far from the values observed in the simulations.
Exploiting the coupling vulnerability in different network configurations represents an interesting area for future work. Experience in the security field indeed teaches that once a vulnerability is identified, more potent attacks are subsequently discovered (consider, for instance, the history of attacks on WEP [31] and MD5 [32] ).
Several approaches are possible to mitigate cascading DoS attacks. First, one could enable the RTS/CTS exchange, al though this solution has several drawbacks, including major performance degradation under normal network operations, as mentioned in the Introduction. The second approach is to lower the retry limit. However, this could also negatively impact performance. Other approaches include using short packets, collision-aware rate adaptation algorithms, and f"ull duplex radios. We leave the investigation and comparison of these mitigation techniques as possible areas for future work.
